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Abstract – The condensed research article presents some innovative research results on 
the venture capital optimal investment portfolio strategies selection in the diffusion-type 
financial systems in the imperfect highly volatile global capital markets with the incomplete 
information, which are characterized by the asymmetric information flows and impacted by the 
various types of the nonlinearities. We discuss the venture capital firms with the different 
organizational structures: the corporation funded venture capital firm, investment bank funded 
venture capital firm, private equity funded venture capital firm, state funded venture capital firm. 
We consider the complicated issues on the venture capital optimal investment portfolio strategies 
selection, evaluation of the possible returns on the investments, and implementation of exit 
strategies for the venture capital investment schemes. We propose that the information signals 
can be mixed and self-modulated during the asymmetric information flows in the information 
transmission channels between the market agents, resulting in the origination of the various types 
of the nonlinearities such as the high order harmonics, which may have a considerable impact on 
the venture capital investments in the diffusion-type financial system. These nonlinearities have 
to be taken to an account during the venture capital optimal investment portfolio strategies 
selection process, which is all about making the right investment choices with the application of 
the inductive, deductive and abductive logics. In our opinion, the State of Queensland in 
Australia is a very attractive place to make the venture capital investments in the hi-tech startups, 
comparing to other regions in the World. We conclude with the notion that the venture capital 
can greatly improve the macroeconomic indicators of national economies, creating the new hi-
tech industries, generating the abundant wealth, and increasing the Gross Domestic Product. 
JEL: C14, C33, D21, D92, G10, G14, G21, G23, G24, L 21 . 
PACS numbers: 89.65.Gh, 89.65.-s, 89.75.Fb . 
Keywords: venture capital concept, venture capital fund, venture capital investment portfolio 
and strategy, corporation funded venture capital firm, investment bank funded venture capital 
firm, private equity funded venture capital firm, state funded venture capital firm, 
entrepreneurship, theory of firm, wealth creation, econophysics, econometrics, nonlinearities, 
asymmetric information flows, mixing and modulation of information signals, diffusion-type 
financial system, imperfect highly volatile global capital markets with incomplete information. 
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Introduction 
 
The venture capital (VC) is considered as an important source of corporate financing in 
the diffusion-type financial systems in the imperfect highly volatile capital markets with the 
incomplete information, which are usually characterized by the asymmetric information flows 
and impacted by the various types of nonlinearities in Jaffee, Russell (1976), Leland, Pyle 
(1977), Stiglitz, Weiss (1981), Stiglitz (1988), Zhang (2007b), Diaconu (2012). The venture 
capital firm invests the venture capital in the selected hi-tech startups, which implement the 
entrepreneurial ideas and compete in the various product and services markets, contributing to 
the overall growth of national economies in Kirzner (1973), Lucas (1978), Audretsch, Keilbach 
(2004), Samila, Sorenson (2011). 
The diffusion processes have a great impact on the physical - chemical properties of 
different chemical compounds, hence the diffusion theory has been a subject of intensive 
research in the physics and chemistry at the research institutions and the leading universities in 
the XX –XXI centuries in Ledenyov D O, Ledenyov V O (2012e), Ledenyov V O, Ledenyov D O, 
Ledenyov O P (2012f), Müller (1997). In addition, the intensive experimental measurements on 
the precise characterization of diffusion processes have been conducted to understand the nature 
of the diffusion processes in the metals, superconductors, semiconductors and dielectrics at the 
different internal and external conditions at the research laboratories at the leading universities in 
the World over the recent decades in Ledenyov V O, Ledenyov D O, Ledenyov O P (2012f), 
Ledenyov D O, Ledenyov V O (2012e), Müller (1997), Chu (1997), Goretta (1998). 
The general perception among the economists is that the diffusion processes can certainly 
have a considerable influence on the various econometric parameters of the diffusion-type 
financial systems, that is why the diffusion theory has been frequently applied to accurately 
characterize the diffusion - type financial systems in the finances in Bachelier (1900), Osborne 
(1959), Alexander (1961), Shiryaev (1961, 1963, 1964, 1965, 1967, 1978, 1998a, b, 2002, 
2008a, b, 2010), Grigelionis, Shiryaev (1966), Graversen, Peskir, Shiryaev (2001), Kallsen, 
Shiryaev (2001, 2002), Jacod, Shiryaev (2003), Peskir, Shiryaev (2006), Feinberg, Shiryaev 
(2006), du Toit, Peskir, Shiryaev (2007), Eberlein, Papapantoleon, Shiryaev (2008, 2009), 
Shiryaev, Zryumov (2009), Shiryaev, Novikov (2009), Gapeev, Shiryaev (2010), Karatzas, 
Shiryaev, Shkolnikov (2011), Shiryaev, Zhitlukhin (2012), Zhitlukhin, Shiryaev (2012), Feinberg, 
Mandava, Shiryaev (2013), Akerlof, Stiglitz (1966), Rothschild, Stiglitz (1976), Stiglitz, Weiss 
(1981), Richiardi, Gallegati, Greenwald, Stiglitz (2007), Bernanke (1979, 2002, 2004, 2007, 
2009a, b, c, d, e, 2010a, b, 2012a, b, 2013a, b, c, d), Bernanke, Blinder (1992), Bernanke, 
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Gertler (1995), Bernanke, Reinhart (2004), Bernanke, Reinhart, Sack (2004), Bernanke, 
Blanchard, Summers, Weber (2013), Shiller, Pound (1989), Stock, Watson (2002), Xiaohong 
Chen, Hansen, Carrasco (2009), Ledenyov D O, Ledenyov V O (2013f, g, h). In this innovative 
research article, we would like to limit our detailed research considerations by an assumption 
that the venture capital investments have place in the diffusion-type financial systems in the 
imperfect highly volatile capital markets with the incomplete information, which are 
characterized by the asymmetric information flows and influenced by the various types of 
induced nonlinearities in Akerlof, Stiglitz (1966), Rothschild, Stiglitz (1976), Stiglitz, Weiss 
(1981), Richiardi, Gallegati, Greenwald, Stiglitz (2007). 
Discussing the early research results on the venture capital investments in the USA, it 
makes sense to begin with literature review, beginning with the notion that the rise and fall of 
venture capital have been researched in Gompers (1994). The research topics on the optimal 
investment, monitoring, and staging of venture capital have been discussed in Gompers (1995, 
1996). The empirical analysis of venture partnership agreements has been completed in 
Gompers, Lerner (1996). The various types of risks during the venture capital investing have 
been reviewed in Gompers, Lerner (1997). The various investment strategies in the corporate 
financing, using the venture capital, have been analyzed in Gompers, Lerner (1998a, b). The 
analysis of compensation in the US venture capital partnership and business interests has been 
completed in Gompers, Lerner (1999a, b). The full venture capital funding cycle has been 
described in Gompers, Lerner (1999c). The various determinants of corporate venture capital 
success have been provided in Gompers, Lerner (2000a). The possible impact of fund inflows on 
private equity valuation has been reflected in Gompers, Lerner (2000b). The venture capital 
revolution has been described in Gompers, Lerner (2001). The new ventures funding has been 
studied in Gompers, Lerner, Scharfstein (2005). The venture capital investment practices have 
been discussed in Gompers (2007). The venture capital investment cycles have been precisely 
characterized in Gompers, Kovner, Lerner, Scharfstein (2008). The allocation of venture capital 
to the successful companies has been shown in Gompers, Kovner, Lerner (2009), Gompers, 
Lerner, Scharfstein, Kovner (2010). The syndication of VC investments has been investigated in 
Lerner (1994a, b). The investment practices by the venture capitalists have been researched in 
Lerner (1995). The selected research topics on the government as source of venture capital 
funding in the frames of the SBIR program have been considered in Lerner (1999). Kortum, 
Lerner (1998) proposed that the venture capital can increase the level of innovation in the 
society. Kortum, Lerner (2000) assessed the contribution by the VC to the innovation in the hi-
tech industry. Lerner, Schoar, Wongsunwai (2007) researched some organizational aspects of the 
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venture capital firm. Lerner (2008) made a few thoughtful research comments on the impact by 
the economic crisis on the venture capital funding dynamics in the USA. The empirical analysis 
of venture capital contracts has been performed in Kaplan, Strömberg (2000, 2002, 2003). The 
advanced researched on the of venture capital contracts has been continued in Kaplan, 
Strömberg (2004). The private equity returns on investments have been investigated in Kaplan, 
Schoar (2005). The annualized returns of venture-backed public companies, categorized by stage 
of financing, have been researched in Shachmurove Y (2001). The annualized and cumulative 
returns on venture-backed public companies, categorized by industry, have been investigated in 
Shachmurove A, Shachmurove Y (2004). The annualized returns of ventured-backed public 
companies, stratified by decades and by stage of financing, have been considered in 
Shachmurove E, Shachmurove Y (2004). The entrepreneurship, innovation, trade and the growth 
mechanism of the free-enterprise economies in Shachmurove Y (2007a). The venture capital 
distribution over the various geographical regions have been analyzed in Shachmurove Y 
(2007b). The investment activity of venture capital in the United States in the years 1996 through 
2005 has been summarized in Shachmurove (2007). The access to venture capital and the 
performance of venture capital-backed star-ups in Silicon Valley have been analyzed in Zhang 
(2007). The influences by the legal differences and experience on the financial contracts have 
been researched in Kaplan, Martel, Strömberg (2007, 2009). The different stages of financing 
through the evolution of firms from early business plans to public companies have been analyzed 
in Kaplan, Sensoy, Strömberg (2009). The past, present, and future of venture capital has been 
described in Kaplan, Lerner (2010). Orman (2008) developed a theoretical model to study the 
effectiveness of various possible organizational arrangements for the innovative startups and 
some issues in the startups activities financing by the VC funds in the USA. The effect of the 
current financial crisis on the venture capital investments in the US Internet firms has been 
analyzed in Block, Sandner (2009). The decline of the United States venture capital industry, 
including some propositions on what the federal government should do about it, has been 
analyzed in Aberman (2009). 
Researching the venture capital investments in Canada, the convertible preferred equity 
puzzle in Canadian venture capital finance has been found in Cumming (2000). The 
determinants of venture capital portfolio size have been described in Cumming (2001). Th 
venture capital exits in Canada and the United States have been analyzed in Cumming, 
MacIntosh (2000). The venture capital investment duration in Canada and the United States has 
been calculated in Cumming, MacIntosh (2001). The private equity investments in Canada have 
been overviewed in Cumming, MacIntosh (2002a). The cross-country comparison of full and 
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partial venture capital exits has been done in Cumming, MacIntosh (2002b). The extent of 
venture capital exits in Canada and the United States has been analyzed in the frames of the 
venture capital contracting and the valuation of high-tech firms research in Cumming, MacIntosh 
(2002c). The economic and institutional determinants of venture capital investment have been 
identified in Cumming, MacIntosh (2002d). The law and finance analysis of venture capital exits 
in emerging markets has been investigated in Cumming, Fleming (2002). A cross-country 
comparison of full and partial venture capital exits has been completed in Cumming, MacIntosh 
(2003). The liquidity risk and venture capital finance in Cumming, Fleming, Schwienbacher 
(2005). The venture capitalist value-added activities, fundraising and drawdowns have been 
analyzed in Cumming, Fleming, Suchard (2005). The legality and venture capital exits have 
been discussed in Cumming, Fleming, Schwienbacher (2006). The crowding out private equity in 
Canada has been analyzed in Cumming, MacIntosh (2006). The contracts and exits in venture 
capital finance have been researched in Cumming (2008). The preplanned exit strategies in 
venture capital have been discussed in Cumming, Johan (2008). The style drift in private equity 
has been considered in Cumming, Fleming, Schwienbacher (2009). The private equity returns 
and disclosure around the world have been studied in Cumming, Walz (2010). 
Considering the venture capital investments in Europe, it is worth to point out that the 
chronological history of the VC capital market in Germany has been surveyed in Franzke, Grohs, 
Laux (2003), making a comparative analysis between the VC capital market in Germany and the 
VC capital markets in the US, UK and France. The implication of the VC on the VC funded 
companies in Germany has been researched in Keilbach, Engel (2003), analyzing the 50,000 
German firms of which roughly 1 per-cent is venture funded. Keilbach, Engel (2003) found the 
multiple evidences that the companies with the higher innovative output (measured by patent 
applications, corrected for size) and with the higher educated management have a larger 
probability of being venture funded. The venture capital, ownership structure, accounting 
standards and IPO underpricing in the cases of German companies have been investigated in 
Elston, Yang (2010). The underpricing, wealth loss for the pre-existing shareholders and the cost 
of going public for the venture capital backed startups has been extensively researched in 
Ferretti, Meles (2011). The first comprehensive comparative analysis between the success of 
European and American VC-backed portfolio companies has been provided in Kraeussl, Krause 
(2011). The survival of venture capital backed companies in France has been researched in 
Pommet (2012). The causal effect by the venture capital backing on the underpricing of the 
Italian IPOs has been investigated in Pennacchio (2013). 
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Reviewing the venture capital investments in Asia, it should be noted that the venture 
capital in Japan has been analyzed in Clark (1988). The venture capital, bank shareholding, and 
IPO underpricing in Japan have been studied in Packer (1996). The Japanese IPOs have been 
researched in Pettway, Kaneko (1996). The investment and operating performance of Japanese 
IPOs have also been investigated in Cai, Wei (1997). The role by the venture capital in the IPOs 
in Japan has been researched in Hamao, Packer, Ritter (1999), who made the following 
comment: “In Japan, most of the major venture capital firms are subsidiaries of securities firms 
and banks.” Hamao, Packer, Ritter (1999) made the interesting observation on the role of VC 
during IPO process in Japan: “Venture capital playing a certification role in alleviating 
informational uncertainty about the IPO at the time of issue.” The venture capital industries of 
East Asia have been described in Kenney, Han, Tanaka (2002). The venture capital industry in 
Singapore has been overviewed in Koh F C C, Koh W T H (2002). Baygan (2003) analyzed the 
trends in South Korean VC markets and examined the VC policies in South Korea, stating that: 
“The Korean venture capital market has grown dramatically in recent years, starting from a 
negligible base in the early 1990s and almost tripling between 1998 and 2001. Korea now ranks 
among the leading OECD countries in venture capital investment as a share of GDP and third in 
the share of venture capital being channeled to start-up enterprises (after the United States and 
Canada). Venture capital contributed to a proliferation of start-ups in the high - technology 
sectors such as the information and communications technology (ICT), which accounted for 64% 
of venture investments in 2001. Baygan (2003) also highlights an interesting fact: “The 
government jump-started the venture capital market in 1998 through direct infusion of equity 
capital, generous tax incentives and equity guarantees, and the designation of certain small firms 
as “venture businesses”.” The R&D networks of the small and medium size companies in Japan 
have been researched in Motohashi (2006). The comparative analysis of the biotechnology 
startups funding by the venture capitalists between the State of Japan and the USA has been 
completed in Motohashi (2010). The venture capital affiliation with the underwriters and the 
underpricing of the initial public offerings in Japan has been researched in Arikawa, 
Imad’eddine (2010). 
Analyzing the venture capital investments in Africa, it has to be mentioned that the 
practical recommendations on the venture capital programme for the South Africa have been 
formulated in Stillman, Sunderland, Heyl, Swart (1999). The investment criteria, used by the 
South African venture capitalists in their venture screening and evaluation processes, have been 
analyzed in Van Deventer, Mlambo (2008, 2009). The challenges and prospects in the early-
stage process of the venture capital funding in South Africa have been presented in Jones, 
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Mlambo (2009). The rise and fall of South African venture capital have been discussed in 
Lingelbach, Murray, Gilbert (2009). 
Da Rin, Hellmann, Puri (2011) state: “There are a lot of public policy programs relating to 
VC, our understanding of these policies, and our ability as academics to make public policy 
recommendations remains limited. More and better data on public programs and policies are needed 
to provide more precise evaluation, and a proper cost/benefit analysis.” Da Rin, Hellmann, Puri 
(2011) continue to explain their vision: “The global VC industry is a relatively young industry that 
is still undergoing major growing pains and significant structural changes. Researchers need to 
remember that they are chasing a moving target. We do not expect them to stand still in such a 
dynamic environment.” We think that our research article will improve our understanding on the VC 
industry modern trends, and present possible approaches to the successful VC financing deals 
completion. 
This research article on the venture capital optimal investment portfolio strategies 
selection in the diffusion-type financial systems in the imperfect highly volatile global capital 
markets with the incomplete information, which are characterized by the asymmetric information 
flows and impacted by the various types of the nonlinearities, aims both: 
1) to present an unbiased open discussion forum opinion on the venture capital optimal 
investment portfolio strategies selection in the conditions of the diffusion-type financial systems 
in the imperfect highly volatile capital markets with the incomplete information, which are 
characterized by the asymmetric information flows and impacted by the various types of the 
induced nonlinearities, and 
2) to enhance our general understanding on the nature of the nonlinearities in the 
finances in Ledenyov V O, Ledenyov D O (2012a, b), Ledenyov D O, Ledenyov V O (2012c, d), 
Ledenyov D O, Ledenyov V O (2013a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h). 
This innovative research is written with the use of the extended knowledge base on the 
nonlinearities in the microwave superconductivity in Ledenyov D O, Ledenyov V O (2012e). 
 
Venture capital investment portfolio allocation theories and practices 
 
Let us make a definition of the venture capital (VC) organization and show its structural 
organizational scheme in Da Rin, Hellmann, Puri (2011): “By VC we mean the professional asset 
management activity that invests funds raised from institutional investors, or wealthy individuals, 
into promising new ventures with a high growth potential.” Da Rin, Hellmann, Puri (2011) 
continue to explain: “Venture investors are organized in small partnerships of up to a dozen 
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individual partners; these are the VC firms. In order to make investment in start-ups, VC firms 
raise money from institutional investors and wealthy individuals through vehicles called ‘funds.’ 
The contract that underlies a fund is traditionally a partnership, where the VC firm exerts active 
management, and therefore assumes unlimited liability, whereas the investors retain unlimited 
liability by not interfering with the fund’s operations. From this structure originate the common 
terms of Limited Partners (LPs), for institutional investors and wealthy individuals, and of 
General Partner (GPs), for the VC firm. During the ten years of the fund’s typical lifetime, GPs 
make the selection of portfolio companies, can monitor, mentor and provide value added 
services, and ultimately exit from the companies, distributing the returns to their LPs. GPs 
receive their compensation in the form of a management fee and of performance-based payments 
called “carried interests” (or just “carry”).” 
Fig. 1 depicts the scheme of venture capital organization in Da Rin, Hellmann, Puri 
(2011). 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Scheme of venture capital organization (after Da Rin, Hellmann, Puri (2011)). 
 
Fig. 2 shows the venture capital markets in Baygan, Freudenberg (2000), and Fig. 3 
depicts the simple framework of underlying factors and impact of venture capital in Baygan, 
Freudenberg (2000)). 
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Fig. 2. Venture capital markets (after Baygan, Freudenberg (2000)). 
 
 
Fig. 3. Simple framework of underlying factors and impact of venture capital (after Baygan, 
Freudenberg (2000)). 
Let us write, discuss and analyze a few more Venture capital (VC) definitions. Da Rin, 
Nicodano, Sembenelli (2004) provide the following VC definition: “Venture capitalists are 
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increasingly recognized as financial intermediaries that overcome problems of moral hazard and 
asymmetric information in financial markets Gompers (1995), Lerner (1995). 
“Venture capital is a form of intermediation particularly well suited to support the 
creation and growth of innovative, entrepreneurial companies Hellmann and Puri (2000, 2002), 
Kortum and Lerner (2000). It specializes in financing and nurturing companies at an early stage 
of development (’start-ups’) that operate in high-tech industries. For these companies the 
expertise of the venture capitalist, its knowledge of markets and of the entrepreneurial process, 
and its network of contacts are most useful to help unfold their growth potential Bottazzi, Da Rin 
and Hellmann (2004), Gompers (1995), Hellmann and Puri (2002), Lerner (1994, 1995), and 
Lindsey (2003).” 
Da Rin, Nicodano, Sembenelli (2006) state: “Venture capital is a form of intermediation 
particularly well suited to support the creation and growth of innovative, entrepreneurial 
companies Hellmann and Puri (2000, 2002), Kortum and Lerner (2000).” 
Luukkonen (2007) explains: “Research on venture capital has shown that venture capita-
lists not only provide their investee companies, innovative entrepreneurial ventures, with finan-
ce, but impart knowhow in business areas where the investee firms lack capabilities, such as stra-
tegic management, recruitment, marketing, and networking; furthermore, they provide the in-
vesttee firms with certification and reputation Hellman, Puri (2002); Bertoni, Colombo, (2005).” 
Geronikolaou, Papachristou (2008) write: “Venture Capital (henceforth VC) is financial 
investment channeled to the development of young, dynamic and innovative firms, and along 
with R&D, plays a major role in technological progress and innovation, most frequently proxied 
by the number of patent applications or grants at the appropriate level, firm, industry or country 
level.” 
Van Deventer, Mlambo (2008, 2009) explain: “Venture capital is a major source of 
funding for the entrepreneurial community and usually focuses on early stage, more risk-
orientated, pre-initial public-offering business endeavours.” 
Block, Sandner (2009) write: “VC is an important means of funding for start-ups in 
innovative and technology driven industries because it is the vehicle used to turn innovative 
ideas into products that can be sold to customers. VC particularly matters when firms start to 
commercialize their innovations, that is, when they develop their products, apply for patents, 
look for distribution partners, seek first customers, conduct their internationalization strategies, 
or simply scale up their operations.” 
Chen, Gompers, Kovner, Lerner (2009) note: “The location of venture capital firms 
matters for the development of entrepreneurial firms because venture capitalists provide more 
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than just risk capital. Venture capital firms typically invest in early-stage and high-technology 
companies where informational asymmetries are high. These are firms have highly uncertain 
future prospects and the potential for agency conflicts are severe. Venture capital funding 
contracts provide for staged financing and venture capitalists are constantly evaluating their 
portfolio companies (see, for example, Sahlman (1990), Gompers (1995), and Kaplan and 
Stromberg (2003)). Venture capitalists are actively involved in the governance of the companies 
they fund through board membership, management recruiting, and the provision of management 
incentives.” 
Inci, Barlo (2010) note: “Unlike banks, VCs are not passive investors. They are 
specialized financial intermediaries who take considerable control in their portfolio. Protective 
provision terms in contracts allow them to veto transactions that are unfavorable to them and 
board control gives them the ability to initiate new transactions.” 
Diaconu (2012) adds: “Venture capital firms do not only provide resources for financing 
of projects, but they give also experience in research activities and diffusion of innovations, 
shaping the company's business strategy.” 
Lazarevski, Mrsik, Smokvarski (2012) state: “Venture capital is an important 
intermediary in financial markets, providing capital to firms who otherwise have difficulties 
attracting financial support. Moreover, venture capital funds provide managerial expertise to the 
company they are investing in, and have impact on the overall economy through innovation, job 
creation, economic growth, increased competition and improved corporate governance.” 
Gvazdaitytė A (2012) suggests the following definition of the venture capital concept: 
“Venture capital (VC) - defined as equity or equity-linked investments in young, privately held 
companies, where the investor is a financial intermediary who is typically active as a director, an 
advisor, or even a manager of the firm Kortum (1998). American literature understands it to be 
an investment by specialized venture capital organizations (VC funds) in high-growth, high-risk, 
often high-technology firms that need capital to finance growth Black and Gilson (1998). While 
in rare instances in Asia VC is considered as a superset, including higher risk, smaller 
investments and all private type investments due to a lack of start-ups or early stage high-
technology companies Wong (2005). Concerning the classical concept of VC capital, they should 
more rightly be called private equity investors than venture capitalists. Van (2000) describes 
venture capital as a capital needed for the launch, early development and expansion of mostly 
high-tech companies with profit expectations.” 
Pommet (2012) writes: “A key function of VC firm is to provide funding and expertise to 
innovative companies with high growth potential.” 
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Pennacchio (2013) explain: “The importance of venture capital is widely recognized in 
both developed and emerging countries. Providing an important source of equity funding and 
often supporting the management of financed firms with their domain expertise, venture 
capitalists facilitate the birth and the growth of new firms, especially in high technological 
industries. Moreover they facilitate the entrepreneurs in dealing with other financing providers: 
private investors, financial intermediaries, and lastly, equity markets.” 
Alqatawni (2013) write: “The venture capital (VCs) is a powerful equity financing 
resource that addresses the funding necessary of entrepreneurial businesses in particular in 
environments of uncertainty Rosenbusch (2012). Venture capital is one the most influential 
factor underlying the economic growth of some regions within the United States Samila (2011). 
The classical definition of VCs is a wealthy person or progressive financial institution that is 
willing to provide sufficient risk capital to appraise the specific opportunity and provide financial 
backing for its introduction to the market place Charpie (1967).” 
Let us summarize all the VC definitions and other research findings by saying that, in the 
case of most innovative start ups, the funding of companies can be done with the use of venture 
capital in Sau (2007): “Venture capital (VC) takes the form of an intermediary collecting 
financing from a group of investors (banks, pension funds, insurance companies and 
foundations) and investing it in the share capital of newly instituted, highly innovative firms.” 
Sau (2007) continues to explain: “In the first place the venture capitalist attends to the screening 
of the innovative firms, so as to reduce the degree of information asymmetry existing ex-ante. In 
fact, the intermediary is often in possession of specific technical competence which improves as 
his work of mediation grows, allowing for a shrewder selection of projects than normally made 
by a generic outside investor-financer or a bank Ueda (2000). Moreover, by granting risk-capital 
the venture-capitalist not only has the possibility of appropriating part of the value generated by 
the firm but can also perform various, very particular functions ranging from managerial 
consultancy to monitoring and even control of the venture-backed firm. As intermediary the 
venture-capitalist carries out the vital activity of information production, generally performed by 
the banks in the case of firms operating in the traditional sectors. Thus the venture-capitalist not 
only has the function of financing in the strict sense, but also provides services that are not 
strictly financial but which prove fundamental17 in the case of innovative firms, above all in the 
early stages of development.” 
In the case of the publicly traded companies, the financing of companies can be done 
with the use of bank credit directly in Sau (2007): “Bank credit proves preferable to the direct 
issue of shares for two reasons basically: 1) the banks are able to apply screening and delegated 
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monitoring directly to the firms: this reduces the degree of information asymmetry, thereby 
minimizing the agency cost of outsider financing Diamond (1984); 2) in an environment of 
imperfect, asymmetrical information the credit agencies take on the function of producing 
information Stiglitz (1985); Stiglitz-Weiss (1988), which has indirect positive effects on the very 
value of the firms financed. In fact, obtaining a loan often entails an increase in share prices 
James (1987); Bayless - Chaplinsky (1990); Alam - Walton (1995); Jong-Veld (2001) since, by 
the very fact of obtaining financing, the firms’ reputation is enhanced to the eyes not only of 
clients and suppliers, but also of other potential investors-financers Diamond (1991).” 
Thus, we can see that the venture capital represents a hybrid form of financing in Sau 
(2007): “Venture capital appears as a hybrid form of financing: it consists in investment in risk-
capital, but is also characterized by the function of intermediation performed by the venture 
capitalist. Over and above the traditional activities of screening and monitoring, with venture 
capital financing it is also possible to allocate power of control over decisions Kaplan-Stromberg 
(2000, 2002), depending on the performance of the venture-backed firm. In this way VC 
succeeds in reconciling the points of force at work in the market-centered financial system with 
those of the bank-centered system Black-Gilson (1998); Rajan-Zingales (2001).” 
Let us comment that the VC industry plays an important role in the national economy 
growth, analyzing the VC funding in the USA, Orman (2008) writes: “One of the major 
developments in U.S. capital markets in the recent decades has been the dramatic growth of the 
venture capital industry: While the amount of funds committed to venture capital was less than 
half a billion in 1978, it has risen over $30 billion by 2007, with a peak of about $100 billion in 
2000 (in 2002 dollars). This change was spurred in large part by the Department of Labor’s 1979 
decision to relax the “Prudent Man Rule”, which had previously obstructed pension funds from 
investing substantial amounts of money in high-risk start-up ventures. Since then venture funds 
have been behind many of the exceptionally innovative companies, including Cisco, Genentech, 
and Google.” Orman (2008) continues to provide the multiple example of the VC funding impact 
on the US economy: “The dramatic growth of the U.S. venture capital since the late 1970’s (a 
significant development in capital markets) and the accompanied explosion of innovation 
produced by small companies is a case in point. Even a casual observation suggests that a 
disproportionate share of path-breaking inventions in biotechnology, semiconductors, hard disk 
drives, minicomputers, software, and the internet has come out of small venture-backed 
companies. Examples of such companies include Cisco, Seagate, Sun Microsystems, Oracle, 
Compaq, Google, eBay, Amazon.com, Genentech, Amgen, and countless others.” Geronikolaou, 
Papachristou (2008) add: “According to Gompers and Lerner (2001), some of the most 
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renowned high-tech innovators in the US, such as Apple Computers, Cisco Systems, Genentech, 
Microsoft, Netscape, and Sun Microsystems, have developed thanks to VC assistance.” 
The interesting fact is that most of the VC firms are located in the financial and hi-tech 
clusters regions in the USA as explained in Chen, Gompers, Kovner, Lerner (2009): “From 
Silicon Valley to Herzliya, Israel, venture capital firms are concentrated in very few locations. 
More than half of the 1,000 venture capital offices listed in Pratt’s Guide to Private Equity and 
Venture Capital Sources are located in just three metropolitan areas – San Francisco, Boston, 
and New York. More than 49% of the U.S.-based companies financed by venture capital firms are 
located in these same three cities.” Chen, Gompers, Kovner, Lerner (2009) continue to present 
the results of their research analysis: “Venture capital firms are likely to locate in areas that offer 
them the highest concentration of profitable investments since geographically close investments 
are easier to for the venture capitalist to monitor. Travel to other geographies is costly and will 
be undertaken only when an investment offers prospects for a high enough return to, in 
expectation, compensate the venture capitalist for the additional time and money associated with 
monitoring a distant investment. The resulting concentration of venture capitalists and 
entrepreneurs may pose grounds for concern given the positive public externalities associated 
with the establishment of new firms.” We would like to add a comment that the financial clusters 
and the high – tech clusters are not always located at the same places in the USA, however the 
presence of the financial clusters and the high – tech clusters at the same region makes a great 
impact on the successful VC industry development in this particular region. 
Lerner (2012) points out on the presence of cyclicality in the venture capitalist industry: 
“The recent changes in the venture capital market have been far from the first such cycles in the 
venture market. Charts 2 and 3 depict the changing amount of venture capital funds raised and 
the returns from these funds.” Lerner (2012) makes one more similar comment: “As I have 
highlighted, venture capital is an intensely cyclical industry, and the impact of venture capital on 
innovation is likely to differ with this cycle.” 
Let us illustrate the venture capital investments dynamics in the USA, analyzed in the 
research articles by the various authors in Lerner (2012), Gompers (2002), Shachmurove Y 
(2007). Fig. 4 shows the venture capital fund raising over the time period of 1969 – 2001 in 
Lerner (2012), and Fig. 5 depicts the returns to the venture capital investments in the time period 
of 1974 – 2001 in Lerner (2012). Fig. 6 shows the venture capital fund – raising and returns 
through 1969 – 1994 in Gompers (2002), and Fig. 7 presents the venture capital fund – raising 
and returns through 1969 – 2000 in Gompers (2002). 
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Fig. 4. Venture capital fund raising over time period of 1969 – 2001 (after Lerner (2012)). 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Returns to venture capital investments in time period of 1974 – 2001 
(after Lerner (2012)). 
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Fig. 6. Venture capital fund – raising and returns through 1969 – 1994 (after Gompers (2002)). 
 
 
 
Fig. 7. Venture capital fund – raising and returns through 1969 – 2000 (after Gompers (2002)). 
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Fig. 8 shows the total venture capital activity in the United States 1995 – 2005 in 
Shachmurove Y (2007), and Fig. 9 presents the total number of deals in venture capital 
investment in the United States in 1995 – 2005 in Shachmurove Y (2007). 
 
 
Fig. 8. Total venture capital activity in the United States 1995 – 2005 in Shachmurove Y (2007). 
 
 
 
Fig. 9. Total number of deals in venture capital investment in the United States in 1995 – 2005 
in Shachmurove Y (2007). 
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Fig. 10 depicts the venture capital under management by the investor type in Canada in 
1992 – 2001 in Cumming, MacIntosh (2003b), and Fig. 11 shows the venture capital funds in 
Canada in 1988 – 2001 in Cumming, MacIntosh (2003b). 
 
 
 
Fig. 10. Venture capital under management by investor type in Canada in 1992 – 2001 (after 
Cumming, MacIntosh (2003b)). 
 
 
 
Fig. 11. Venture capital funds in Canada in 1988 – 2001 (after Cumming, MacIntosh (2003b)). 
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Fig. 12 shows the stages of venture capital investment in Canada in 1977 – 2001 in 
Cumming, MacIntosh (2003b), and Fig. 13 provides information on the venture capital exits in 
Canada in 1991 – 1998 in Cumming, MacIntosh (2003b). 
 
 
Fig. 12. Stages of venture capital investment in Canada in 1977 – 2001 (after Cumming, 
MacIntosh (2003b)). 
 
 
 
Fig. 13. Venture capital exits in Canada in 1991 – 1998 (after Cumming, MacIntosh (2003b)). 
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Let us explain that there is a big number of different VC industry development programs 
in many countries in Sau (2007): “SBIR (Small Business Innovation Research) and SBIC (Small 
Business Investment Company) in the USA, the ETF (European Technology Facility), I-TEC 
(Innovation and Technology Equity Capital) and LIFT (Linking Innovation, Finance and 
Technology) in the European Union.” 
Fig. 14 shows the OECD venture capital investment by stages as a share of GDP in 1998 
- 2001 in Baygan (2003). 
 
 
Fig. 14. OECD venture capital investment by stages as a share of GDP, 1998-2001  
(after Baygan (2003)). 
 
Da Rin, Nicodano, Sembenelli (2006) point out: “The creation of 'active' venture capital 
markets, i.e. venture capital markets which provide strong support for early stage and high-tech 
ventures, has received a high priority by economic policy. As economies become ever more 
dependent on innovation and entrepreneurship for achieving sustained growth, governments 
around the world have been trying to replicate the diffusion and success that venture capital has 
achieved in the United States.” Let us add that the creation of the VC market requires the 
presence of social, scientific, financial and information technology infrastructures. Gvazdaitytė 
(2012) explains: “Literature analysis has shown that the main conditions, needed to create 
venture capital industry are: appropriate financial market structure, human resources 
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availability, source of opportunities, supporting institutions and government policy. As well the 
collaboration between universities, private companies and governments is essential.” 
Tab. 1 shows the agents involved in creating venture capital industry in Gvazdaitytė 
(2012). 
 
 
 
Tab. 1. Agents involved in creating venture capital industry (after Gvazdaitytė (2012)). 
 
The modern research projects, aiming to create the extended knowledge base on the 
venture capital investments, have been conducted by many world renowned scientists: Rind 
(1981); Tyebjee, Bruno (1981), Bruno, Tyebjee (1983, 1986), Tyebjee, Bruno (1984), Chan 
(1983), Felda, DeNino, Salter (1983), Wilson (1983); Merkle (1984); Hutt, Thomas (1985), 
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MacMillan, Siegel, Narasimha (1985), MacMillan, Zemann, Narasimha (1987); Beatty, Ritter 
(1986), Nevermann, Falk (1986), Timmons, Bygrave (1986); Block, Ornati (1987), Bygrave 
(1987), Bygrave, Timmons (1992), Robinson (1987), Ruhnka, Young (1987, 1991), Ruhnka, 
Felman, Dean (1992), Sandberg, Hofer (1987), Stedler (1987); Brophy, Guthner (1988), Clark 
(1988), Eisinger (1988, 1993), Florida, Kenney (1988), Florida, Smith (1993), Gladstone (1988), 
Harris, Raviv (1988), Hofer (1988), MacMillan, Kulow, Khoylian (1988), Sandberg, Schweiger, 
Schmidt (1988), Siegel R, Siegel E, MacMillan (1988), Tirole (1988); Benveniste, Spindt (1989), 
Gorman, Sahlman (1989), Holmstrom, Tirole (1989), Poterba (1989a, b); Amit, Glosten, Muller 
(1990a, b), Amit, Brander, Zott (1998), Barry, Muscarella, Peavy, Vetsuypens (1990), Barry 
(1994), Chan, Siegel, Thakor (1990), Hisrich, Jankowitz (1990), Sahlman (1990, 1993), Sykes 
(1990); Dixon (1991), Megginson, Weiss (1991); Sapienza (1992), Sapienza, Gupta (1994), 
Sapienza, Manigart, Vermeir (1996); Hall, Hofer (1993), Rosenstein, Bruno, Bygrave, Taylor 
(1993), Sahlman (1993); Admati, Pfleiderer (1994), Aghion, Tirole (1994), Anton, Yao (1994), 
Berglöf (1994), Bhidé (1994), Fried, Hisrich (1994), Gompers (1994, 1995, 1996, 1998, 2002, 
2007), Gompers, Lerner (1996, 1997, 1998a, b, c, 1999a, b, c, d, 2000a, b, 2001a, b), Brav, 
Gompers (1997), Baker, Gompers (2003), Brav, Gompers (2003), Gompers, Lerner, Scharfstein 
(2005), Gompers, Kovner, Lerner, Scharfstein (2006, 2008), Gompers, Kovner, Lerner (2009), 
Gompers, Lerner, Scharfstein, Kovner (2010), Knight (1994), Kroszner, Rajan (1994), Lerner 
(1994a, b, 1995a, b, 1998, 1999, 2002, 2008, 2009), Kortum, Lerner (1998, 2000), Lerner, 
Shane, Tsai (2003), Lerner, Schoar (2004, 2005), Lerner, Moore, Shepherd (2005), Lerner, 
Schoar, Wongsunwai (2007), Lerner, Sorensen, Strömberg (2009), Chen, Gompers, Kovner, 
Lerner (2009), Lerner, Tåg (2012), Puri (1994, 1996), Puri, Robinson (2011); Anton, Yao 
(1995), Elango, Fried, Hisrich, Polonchek (1995), Hart (1995), Jain, Kini (1995), Loughran, 
Ritter (1995), Willner (1995); Muzyka, Birley, Leleux (1996), Packer (1996), Pettway, Kaneko 
(1996); Amit, Brander, Zott (1997), Cai, Wei (1997), Chevalier, Ellison (1997), Gilford (1997), 
Karsai, Wright, Filatotchev (1997), Wright, Robbie, Ennew (1997), Manigart, Wright, Robbie, 
Desbrieres, De Waele (1997), Manigart, Baeyens, Hyfte (2002), Manigart, De Waele, Wright, 
Robbie, Desbrieres, Sapienza, Beekman (2000, 2002); Bergemann, Hege (1998), Berger, Udell 
(1998), Berger, Schaek (2011), Black, Gilson (1998), Cornelius , Isaksson (1998), Fried, Bruton, 
Hisrich (1998), Gerke (1998), Hellmann (1998, 2000, 2002, 2006, 2007), Hellmann, Puri (2000, 
2002), Becker, Hellmann (2005), Hellmann, Lindsey, Puri (2004, 2008), Hyde (1998), Jacobs, 
Scheffler (1998), Karsai (1998, 2003, 2004), Karsai, Wright, Dudzinski, Morovic (1999), Lin, 
Smith (1998), Marx (1998), Marx, Strumsky, Fleming (2009), Murray, Marriott (1998), Prowse 
(1998), Rajan, Zingales (1998), Trester (1998), Wright, Robbie (1998), Zider (1998); Aernoudt 
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(1999), Bliss (1999), Bygrave, Hay, Peeters (1999), Gilson (1999), Gilson, Schizer (2002, 2003), 
Gulati, Gargiulo (1999), Hamao, Packer, Ritter (1999), Leopold (1999), Neher (1999), Shepherd 
(1999), Shepherd, Zacharakis (1999), Stillman, Sunderland, Heyl, Swart (1999); Baygan, 
Freudenberg (2000), Baygan (2003), Bharat, Galetovic (2000), Cumming (2000, 2001, 2008), 
Cumming, MacIntosh (2000, 2001, 2002a, 2002b, 2002c, 2002d, 2003a, b, 2006), Cumming, 
Fleming (2002), Cumming, Fleming, Schwienbacher (2005, 2006, 2009), Cumming, Fleming, 
Suchard (2005), Cumming, Johan (2008), Cumming, Walz (2010), Gans, Stern (2000, 2003), 
Gans, Hsu, Stern (2002), Jain, Kini (2000), Jeng, Wells (2000), Kaplan, Strömberg (2000, 2001, 
2002, 2003, 2004, 2009), Kaplan, Schoar (2005), Kaplan, Martel, Strömberg (2007), Kaplan, 
Sensoy, Strömberg (2009), Kaplan, Lerner (2010), Karaömerlioğlu, Jacobsson (2000), Koski 
(2000), Lee (2000), Lehtonen (2000), Quindlen (2000), Schefczyk (2000), Schertler (2000); 
Bascha, Walz (2001), Engel (2001a, b, 2002); Francis, Hasan (2001), Fredriksen, Klofsten 
(2001), Hyytinen, Pajarinen (2001), Keuschnigg, Nielsen (2001, 2003a, b, 2004a, b), 
Keuschnigg (2003, 2004a, b), Kanniainen, Keuschnigg (2004), Kirilenko (2001), Lockett, Wright 
(2001), Maula, Murray (2001), Peng (2001), Seppä, Laamanen (2001), Seppä (2003), 
Shachmurove Y (2001, 2007a, b), Shachmurove A, Shachmurove Y (2004), Shachmurove E, 
Shachmurove Y (2004), Sorenson, Stuart (2001); Allen, Song (2002), Audretsch, Lehmann 
(2002), Bottazzi, Da Rin (2002a, b, 2004), Bottazzi, Da Rin, Giavazzi (2003), Bottazzi, Da Rin, 
Hellmann (2004a, b, 2008, 2009), Brander, Amit, Antweiler (2002), Brander, De Bettignies 
(2009), Brander, Egan, Hellmann (2008), Brander, Du, Hellmann (2010), Chesbrough (2002), 
Cestone (2002), Davis, Schachermayer, Tompkins (2002), Dossani, Kenney (2002), Kenney, 
Han, Tanaka (2002), Eisele, Habermann, Oesterle (2002), Everts (2002), Koh F C C, Koh W T 
H (2002), McGlue (2002), Moskowitz, Vissing-Jørgensen (2002), Shane, Cable (2002), Shane, 
Stuart (2002), Zook (2002); Becker, Hellman (2003), Bergemann, Hege (2003), Hege, Palomino, 
Schwienbacher (2009), Casamatta (2003), Casamatta, Haritchabalet (2007), Cornelli, Yosha 
(2003), Davila, Foster, Gupta (2003), Franzke, Grohs, Laux (2003), Gawlik, Teczke (2003), 
Gilson, Schizer (2003), Hirukawa, Ueda (2003), Inderst, Muller (2003), Keilbach, Engel (2003), 
Leleux, Surlemont (2003), Rindermann (2003), Schertler (2003), Schmidt (2003), Schmidt, 
Wahrenburg (2003), Stuart, Sorenson (2003), Wang C K, Wang K, Lu (2003), Wasserman (2003, 
2006), Woodward, Hall (2003); Aghion, Bolton, Tirole (2004), Avnimelech, Kenney, Teubal 
(2004), Avnimelech, Teubal (2004), Baum, Silverman (2004), Berk, Green, Naik (2004), Da Rin, 
Nicodano, Dittmann, Maug, Kemper (2004), Hsu (2004), Inderst, Müller (2004, 2009), Inderst, 
Müller, Muennich (2007), Jones, Rhodes-Kropf (2004), Lee, Wahal (2004), Megginson (2004), 
Michelacci, Suarez (2004), Mishra (2004), Peggy, Wahal (2004), Repullo, Suarez (2004), 
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Roman, van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2004), Sembenelli (2004), Sternberg (2004), Ueda 
(2004); Bergemann, Hege (2005), Cochrane (2005), Da Rin, Hege, Llobet, Walz (2005), Da Rin, 
Nicodano, Sembenelli (2005, 2006), Da Rin, Hellmann, Puri (2011), De Carvalho, Calomiris, 
De Matos (2005), Dessein (2005), Dessí (2005), Dimov, Shepherd (2005), Dushnitsky, Lenox 
(2005, 2006), Dushnitsky, Lavie (2008), Ernst, Witt, Brachtendorf (2005), Ge, Mahoney J M, 
Mahoney J T (2005), Hsu, Kenney (2005), Hsu (2006, 2007), Klepper, Sleeper (2005), Klepper, 
Thompson (2010), Kõomägi (2005a, b, c), Kõomägi, Sander (2006), Lai (2005, 2007), Mäkelä, 
Maula (2005), Mayer, Schoors, Yafeh (2005), Mayer, Schoors, Yafeh (2005), Neus, Walz (2005), 
Wong (2005), Zook (2005); Antonelli, Teubal (2006), Cassiman, Ueda (2006), Colombo, Dimov, 
De Clercq (2006), Eckhardt, Shane, Delmar (2006), Ellul, Pagano (2006), Gebhardt, Schmidt 
(2006), Grilli, Piva (2006), Fallick, Fleischman, Rebitzer (2006), Franco, Filson (2006), 
Franco, Mitchell (2008), Isaksson (2006), Mathews (2006), Motohashi (2006, 2010), Nielsen, 
Keuschnigg (2006), Proimos, Murray (2006), Riyanto, Schwienbacher (2006), Wadhwa, Kotha 
(2006), Zhang (2006, 2007a, b); Bernile, Cumming, Lyandres (2007), Campbell, Kraeussl 
(2007), Colombo, Dawid, Kabus (2007), de Bettignies, Brander (2007), de Bettignies, Chemla 
(2008), de Bettignies (2008), Engel, Keilbach (2007), Hochberg, Ljungqvist, Lu (2007, 2010), 
Hsu (2007), Jovanovic, Szentes (2007), Lai (2007), Li, Prabhala (2007), Luukkonen (2007, 
2008), Mann, Sager (2007), Pintado, De Lema, Van Auken (2007), Robinson, Stuart (2007), Sau 
(2007), Schwienbacher (2007, 2008), Sørensen (2007), Tykvová (2007); Aizenman, Kendall 
(2008), Broughman (2008), Broughman, Fried (2010), Davidsson, Steffens, Gordon, Senyard 
(2008), Geronikolaou, Papachristou (2008), Hand (2008), Hirukawa, Ueda (2008a, b), Katila, 
Rosenberger, Eisenhardt (2008), Lindsey (2008), McMillan, Roberts, Livada, Wang (2008), 
Orman (2008), Rossetto (2008), Schwienbacher (2008, 2009), Sorenson, Stuart (2008), Winton, 
Yerramilli (2008), Nahata (2008), Phalippou (2008), Phalippou, Gottschalg (2009), Puri, 
Zarutskie (2008), Van Deventer, Mlambo (2008, 2009); Aberman (2009), Bengtsson, Ravid 
(2009), Bengtsson, Hand (2011), Bengtsson, Sensoy (2011), Block, Sandner (2009), Clarysse, 
Knockaert, Wright (2009), Cockburn, MacGarvie (2009), Duffner, Schmid, Zimmermann (2009), 
Fitza, Matusik, Mosakowski (2009), Fulghieri, Sevilir (2009a, b), Jones, Mlambo (2009), 
Krohmer, Lauterbach, Calanog (2009), Lingelbach, Murray, Gilbert (2009), Litvak (2009a, b), 
Masulis, Nahata (2009, 2011), Norbäck, Persson (2009), Samuelsson, Davidsson (2009), Van de 
Vrande, Vanhaverbeke, Duysters (2009); Arikawa, Imad’eddine (2010), Benson, Ziedonis 
(2010), Bienz, Walz (2010), Cantner, Stützer (2010), Cowling, Murray, Liu (2010), Dushnitsky, 
Shapira (2010), Elston, Yang (2010), Groh, Liechtenstein (2010), Hall, Woodward (2010), Inci, 
Barlo (2010), Ivanov, Xie (2010), Jegadeesh, Kräussl, Pollet (2010), Korteweg, Sørensen (2010), 
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Metrick, Yasuda (2010, 2011), Obschonka, Silbereisen, Schmitt-Rodermund, StuetzerNascent 
(2010), Samila, Sorenson (2010, 2011), Sevilir (2010), Zarutskie (2010), Zacharakis, Erikson, 
George (2010); Ball, Chiu, Smith (2011), Cherif, Gazdar (2011), Das, Jo, Kim (2011), Ferretti, 
Meles (2011), Kandel, Leshchinskii, Kraeussl, Krause (2011), Kerr, Nanda (2011), Li, 
Abrahamsson (2011), Samila, Sorenson (2011), Tian (2011), Yuklea (2011); Diaconu (2012), 
Gvazdaitytė (2012), Lazarevski, Mrsik, Smokvarski (2012), Lim, Cu (2012), Pommet (2012), 
Rosenbusch, Brinckmann, Müller (2012), Yitshaki (2012); Alqatawni (2013), Brettel, Mauer, 
Appelhoff (2013), Pennacchio (2013), Stuetzer, Obschonka, Davidsson, Schmitt-Rodermund 
(2013), Stuetzer, Obschonka, Schmitt-Rodermund (2013). 
 
Venture capital optimal investment portfolio strategies in highly volatile 
global capital markets with nonlinearities 
 
Let us begin with the formulation of the innovative start-ups financing problem in the 
frames of the theory of corporate finance in Tirole (2006). The main three problems in the 
startups funding are outlined in Orman (2008):  
1. “First, specialized research ventures require substantial upfront resources but do 
not generate cash flows for a long time.  
2. Second, research ventures are typically surrounded by substantial uncertainty 
concerning their potential outcomes.  
3. Finally, most of the assets of a research venture is intangible and hence cannot be 
used as collateral. 
All of these issues potentially reduce the willingness of suppliers of capital to provide 
financing to such ventures. In extreme situations, these difficulties may even cause credit-
rationing in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).” 
The VC financing represents a possible solution for the above mentioned financial 
problems in the cases of innovative start-up companies. There are a number of different 
investment stages in the venture capital financing. Therefore, let us provide some information on 
the different VC financing stages in the process of the innovative startup company development 
in Geronikolaou, Papachristou (2008): “European Venture Capital Association’s (EVCA) 
terminology split VC into three stages namely, 
1. Seed finance (intended for new firms in order to evaluate their initial concept), 
2. Start-up finance (aiming at the development of the firm’s product before the firm 
has sold any products), and 
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3. Expansion finance (aiming to assist the growth and expansion of the firm).” 
Sau (2007) proposes a general scheme of the most innovative start-ups financing: 
1. Insider capital, informal private equity and easy-term public financing (Seed); 
2. Venture capital financing (Start-up);  
3. Self-financing, bank and/or business credit (Early Growth); 
4. Direct issue of bonds and public equity (Sustained Growth). 
Gompers (2002) distinguishes a few investment stages in the innovative startup company: 
1.  Start-up: Company with a skeletal business plan, product, or service 
development in preliminary stages. 
2. Development: Stage at which product or service development is under way but 
the company is not generating revenues from sales. 
3. Beta: For companies specializing in information technology, the phase at which 
the product is being tested by a limited number of customers but not available for broad sale. For 
life sciences companies, beta is synonymous with a drug in human clinical trials or a device 
being tested. 
4. Shipping: The stage at which the product or service is being sold to customers and 
the company is deriving revenues from those sales but expenses still exceed revenues. 
5. Profitable: The stage at which the company is selling products or services and the 
sales revenue yields a positive net income. 
6. Restart: The stage at which the firm is recapitalized at a reduced valuation, 
accompanied by a substantial shift in the product or marketing focus. 
Van Deventer, Mlambo (2008, 2009) write: “There have been several studies done trying 
to identify the different stages and criteria of the decision-making process. Studies on the 
processes and criteria used by venture capitalists have been done by Tyebjee and Bruno (1984), 
MacMillan et al. (1985; 1987), Fried and Hisrich (1994), Shepherd (1999), Kaplan and 
Strömberg (2003), Kakati (2003), Ge et al. (2005) and Pintado, De Lema and Van Auken (2007). 
According to Larsson and Roosvall (2000:4), the process is generally conducted in such a way 
that new ventures must first pass an initial screening, which is typically a review of the business 
plan. “This is then followed by meetings, a due diligence phase and negotiations around the more 
detailed issues regarding the investment.”” 
Fig. 15 shows the general VC financing scheme in Eisele, Habermann, Oesterle (2002). 
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Fig. 15. Venture capital financing scheme (after Eisele, Habermann, Oesterle (2002)). 
 
In the process of the optimal VC investment portfolio selection, the VC firms complete a 
number of important tasks in Keilbach, Engel (2003): “...Venture capital firms screen potential 
portfolio firms to select out those with the best growth perspectives. The innovative potential (as 
signalled by patent applications and by the founders’ education levels) play an important role in 
that respect. This screening process is very selective though successful since venture capital 
funded firms display indeed higher (twice as large) growth rate as compared to firms of a control 
group. This stronger growth rate seems to be a result of a commercialization of previous 
innovations since innovation outputs of venture funded firms do not differ from non venture 
funded but otherwise strongly similar group of firms of a control group. A plausible explanation 
for this finding could be that venture capital investors assist their portfolio firms in this 
commercialization effort, rather than in further innovation effort, in an attempt to maximize 
sales, hence value, of their portfolio firms. Commercialization is probably done by financial 
means but also by means of management assistance.” 
There are several criteria, which can be classified into the two groups such as the 
important criteria and the unimportant criteria in the process of the decision making on the VC 
financing. Tab. 2 presents the criteria rated as important by participating VCs, and Tab. 3 shows 
the criteria rated as not important by participating VCs in Van Deventer, Mlambo (2008, 2009). 
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Tab. 2. Criteria rated as important by participating VCs 
(after Van Deventer, Mlambo (2008, 2009)). 
 
 
 
Tab. 3. Criteria rated as not important by participating VCs 
(after Van Deventer, Mlambo (2008, 2009)). 
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Fig. 16 shows the venture capital decision-making process in Kõomägi, Sander (2006), 
and Fig. 17 depicts the quantitative decision-making process among venture capitalists in 
Estonia in Kõomägi, Sander (2006). 
 
 
Fig. 16. Venture capital decision-making process (after Kõomägi, Sander (2006)). 
 
 
 
Fig. 17. The quantitative decision-making process among venture capitalists in Estonia 
(after Kõomägi, Sander (2006)). 
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The necessary and sufficient condition for the startup firm to obtain the financing from 
the uninformed investors is in Da Rin, Nicodano, Sembenelli (2005) 
 
 
where I is the cost of the investment, A is the firm’s own equity capital which is pledged as 
collateral, I − A > 0 is the amount of capital, which is necessary to borrow for the firm, pH is the 
probability to deliver the return R, B denotes the private benefits for the entrepreneurs, Ru=R−Rf 
is the share of return to uninformed investors, Rf is the share of return, retained by the firm. 
Therefore, the market value of the loan (the left hand side) cannot exceed the firm’s 
expected income (the right-hand side). Firms are then able to raise finance from uninformed 
investors if and only if in Da Rin, Nicodano, Sembenelli (2005) 
 
 
where A is increasing in γ. 
The amount of funds borrowed by monitored firms Ivc adjusts to satisfy the incentive 
compatibility constraint of the venture capitalist in Da Rin, Nicodano, Sembenelli (2005) 
 
 
where β is the rate of return to venture capital, β=pHRvc/Ivc. 
The necessary and sufficient condition for a firm to be financed by both uninformed 
investors and venture capitalists is then in Da Rin, Nicodano, Sembenelli (2005) 
 
 
where c is the monitoring cost. 
Fig. 18 shows the firm’s financing choices, depending on their own equity capital in Da 
Rin, Nicodano, Sembenelli (2005). 
 
Fig. 18. Firm’s financing choice as a function of their equity capital, A (after in Da Rin, Nicodano, 
Sembenelli (2005)). 
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Fig. 19 shows the factors, impacting the early-stage venture capital in South Africa in 
Jones, Mlambo (2009), and Fig. 20 represents some information on the activity areas, where the 
venture capitalist is responsible for implementation in Luukkonen (2008). 
 
 
Fig. 19. Factors impacting early-stage venture capital in South Africa in Jones, Mlambo (2009). 
 
 
Fig. 20. Activity areas where the venture capitalist is responsible for implementation 
(after Luukkonen (2008)). 
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Da Rin, Hege, Llobet, Walz (2005) write: “The theoretical and empirical literature has 
focused on a relative small number of factors as the leading performance drivers in venture 
capital success. First, venture capitalists are typically active investors: they provide monitoring 
and advising besides capital. Second, the venture capital industry has long resorted to a wide 
array of specific contractual mechanisms to mitigate agency conflicts, in particular instruments 
of contingent control and stage financing.”  
Aiming to increase the venture capital success, the venture capitalists tend to conduct the 
VC networking and form the syndicates.  
Da Rin, Hellmann, Puri (2011) explain: “Bubna et al. (2011) examine the clustering in 
VC partner choices. They find that VCs tend to syndicate with preferred partners drawn from 
clusters that they call VC “communities.” Using flexible community detection algorithms 
originating in the physical sciences, they examine the number of communities, their composition, 
and their effect on performance. They find that VCs communities are structurally complex, with 
heterogeneity in some characteristics such as size and influence but homogeneity in 
characteristics in other dimensions such as stage focus. Firms funded by community VCs are 
more likely to experience a successful exit.” 
Lai (2005) writes: “Venture capital firms (VCs) form syndicates that compete to invest in 
deals.” Fig. 21 shows the VCs networking scheme in Lai (2005).  
 
Fig. 21. VCs networking scheme: VCs are depicted as nodes. An arrow from one VC to another 
means that the former has selected the latter in a previous syndicate. Isolated nodes on left are 
VCs who select no VCs before. All lead VCs are shown, but only candidate VCs who have been 
selected by some lead VC are shown (after Lai (2005)). 
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Let us discuss the asymmetric information problem between the various market agents. 
The impact by the investments on the economy performance has been studied in Akerlof, Stiglitz 
(1966). The theory of innovation has been researched in Stiglitz (1969). The fact that the 
competition and entrepreneurship are important factors for the economy growth has been 
outlined in Kirzner (1973). The theory of firm has been well formulated in Jensen, Meckling 
(1976), Lucas (1978). The problems of the imperfect information, uncertainty and credit 
rationing between the market agents in the conditions of market economy have been considered 
in Jaffee, Russell (1976). The existence of the credit rationing problem in the markets with the 
incomplete information has been also confirmed in Stiglitz, Weiss (1981), Stiglitz (1988). The 
new theory of the firm, taking to the account the asymmetric information flows, has been 
proposed in Greenwald, Stiglitz (1990). It has been discovered that in Greenwald, Stiglitz 
(1990): “Imperfect information affects both the internal organization of firms and its external 
relations with labor, capital and product markets.” The asymmetric effect of diffusion processes has 
been explained in Richiardi, Gallegati, Greenwald, Stiglitz (2007). 
Zhang (2007b) explains: “VC investment is characterized by an asymmetric information 
problem between equity investors and the entrepreneur Leland and Pyle (1977); Amit et al. 
(1990); Fried and Hisrich (1994); Gompers (1995). VC investors often bet millions of dollars on 
a start-up, whose future success will in large part be determined by the quality of the founder. 
Usually investors possess less information about the entrepreneur’s ability and the viability of his 
business plan than the entrepreneur himself does. This information asymmetry prevents venture 
capitalists from investing a large amount of money in start-ups.” Zhang (2007b) notes: “There 
are many ways to overcome this asymmetric information problem Gompers and Lerner (1999). 
In a sense, the general practice of staged investment in the VC industry is meant to provide a 
partial solution to this problem Gompers (1995). Venture capitalists almost always make 
investment decisions stage by stage: they only provide a small amount of money to a start-up 
initially, and base later investment decisions on the start-up’s performance. In this way, 
venture capitalists can evaluate the entrepreneur’s ability and the viability of his plan over time. 
Furthermore, as another solution to the asymmetric information problem, venture capitalists rely 
heavily on the referrals of social contacts to identify and evaluate an entrepreneur Tyebjee and 
Bruno (1984).” 
Pennacchio (2013) writes: “A measure that is widely used in the economic literature to 
examine the role of venture capitalists in IPOs is the underpricing: the difference between the 
price of the shares in the first day of trading and the price of the shares offered to investors. The 
analysis of the venture capital backing’s effect on the IPO underpricing is a suitable way to 
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investigate whether venture capitalists are able to reduce the asymmetric information that 
arises in the IPO process and the cost of flotation for the issuers. Many theories explain the 
underpricing in a context of asymmetric information between the actors involved in the IPO, 
typically issuing firms, underwriters and investors Baron (1982); Rock (1986); Benveniste and 
Spindt (1989); Beatty and Ritter (1986). According to such theories, the underpricing represents 
a proxy of the ex-ante uncertainty regarding the issue that increases with the increasing of the 
degree of information asymmetries Eckbo (2008).” 
We propose that the information signals can be mixed and self-modulated during the 
asymmetric information flows in the information transmission channels between the various 
market agents, resulting in an origination of the different types of the nonlinearities such as the 
high order harmonics, which may have a considerable impact on the VC’s decision making 
process on the venture capital investments in the diffusion-type financial system. In our opinion, 
these nonlinearities have to be taken to an account during the venture capital optimal investment 
portfolio strategies selection process, which is all about making the right investment choices, 
using the econophysical econometrical analysis in Greene (2008) with the application of the 
inductive, deductive and abductive logics in Martin (1998-1999, 2005-2006). Thus, let us 
provide the definitions for the different types of logics, which can be used in the venture capital 
optimal investment portfolio strategies selection process in Martin (1998-1999, 2005-2006): 
Inductive logic — the logic of what is operative — reasons from the specific to the 
general. Induction allows inferring a entails b from multiple instantiations of a and b at the same 
time. 
Deductive logic — the logic of what must be — reasons from the general to the specific. 
Deduction allows deriving b as a consequence of a. In other words, deduction is the process of 
deriving the consequences of what is assumed. 
Abductive logic –the logic of what could possibly be true –reasons through successive 
approximation. Abduction allows inferring a as an explanation of b, because of this, abduction 
allows the precondition a to be inferred from the consequence b. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This research article presents some innovative research results on the venture capital 
optimal investment portfolio strategies selection in the diffusion-type financial systems in the 
imperfect highly volatile global capital markets with the incomplete information, which are 
characterized by the asymmetric information flows and impacted by the various types of the 
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nonlinearities. We discussed the venture capital firms with the different organizational 
structures: the corporation funded venture capital firm, investment bank funded venture capital 
firm, private equity funded venture capital firm, state funded venture capital firm. We provided a 
comprehensive review on the venture capital investments academic literature. We considered the 
complicated issues on the venture capital optimal investment portfolio strategies selection, 
evaluation of the possible returns on the investments, and implementation of the exit strategies 
for the venture capital investment schemes. We proposed that the information signals can be 
mixed and self-modulated during the asymmetric information flows in the information 
transmission channels between the various market agents, resulting in an origination of the 
various types of the nonlinearities, which may have a considerable impact on the venture capital 
investments in the diffusion-type financial system. These nonlinearities have to be taken to an 
account during the venture capital optimal investment portfolio strategies selection process, 
which is all about making the right investment choices during the econophysical econometrical 
analysis with the application of the inductive, deductive and abductive logics. In our opinion, the 
development of venture capital industry, including the venture capital firms and the venture 
capital funded high-tech startups, can greatly improve the macroeconomic indicators of national 
economies by creating the new hi-tech startups, generating the new wealth, and increasing the 
Gross Domestic Product. We focus on the fact that the business reputation of a venture capital 
firm is a valuable firm’s asset in the conditions of strong business competition. Of course, there 
are some differences between the VC financing approaches in various countries, for instance, 
Motohashi (2010) writes: “Japanese VCs are less likely to invest in early stage startups, while 
US ones are involved in “screening” and “monitoring” activities of venture businesses. This may 
be related to under-developed private equity markets in Japan and substantial VC investments in 
Japan are organized by bank affiliated VCs.” We think that, in the present time, the VC industry 
in the State of Queensland is in a rapid development phase, because the State of Queensland has 
adopted all the necessary policies to become a very attractive place for the venture capital 
investments in the hi-tech startups in Australia, comparing to other regions in the World. We 
think that the globalization will have a considerable influence on the VC industry, creating the 
new high potential growth financial and hi-tech clusters with a big number of the VC firms in 
Australia and in Asia. At the same time, we have to remember that as it is explained in Lerner 
(2012): “My analysis suggests that the market for venture capital may be subject to substantial 
imperfections and that these imperfections may substantially lower the total social gain achieved 
by venture finance.” We would like to conclude with the optimistic statement in Kraeussl, 
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Krause (2011): “Entrepreneurship, innovation, and venture capital (VC) are pivotal to success in 
economic development, as they provide for wealth creation and a rising standard of living.” 
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information, asymmetric information, and theory of firm, which were obtained by                  
Prof. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Columbia University, and The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic 
Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2001 laureate, who was graduated with the Ph. D degree 
from Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in Stiglitz (2001, 2002): “It was the hey-day 
of MIT with first-rate professors (I had at least four Nobel Prize winners as professor: Samuelson 
(Nobel Laureate in 1970), Solow (Nobel Laureate in 1987), Modigliani (Nobel Laureate in 
1985), and Arrow (Nobel Laureate in 1972)) teaching first-rate students.” Analyzing the recent 
developments in the US economy, Prof. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Columbia University provided the 
following accurate characteristics to the present state of the US financial system in Stiglitz 
(2013): “The financial system has become even more concentrated, exacerbating the problem of 
banks that are not only too big, too interconnected, and too correlated to fail, but that are also too 
big to manage and be held accountable.” In our opinion, Prof. Joseph E. Stiglitz was one of the 
first scientists, who mentioned a great possible influence by the asymmetric information flows 
between the various market agents on the venture capital investments in the diffusion-type 
financial system. We think that these risk factors can be directly connected with 1) the financial 
and monetary stabilities of financial systems; 2) the increasing degree of volatility in the global 
capital markets in the time of uncertainty; 3) the presence of necessary knowledge base and 
practical skills to precisely evaluate the new innovative technology, necessary venture capital 
investments and possible returns-on-investments. 
We would like to express our kind sincere gratitude to Prof. Dr. Ben Shalom Bernanke, 
Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System for the insightful thoughtful 
scientific discussions in the finances and economics and considerable research interest by 
encouraging us to think wisely in the course of our advanced research and to make everything 
possible to complete the research program timely by giving us access to the electronic copies of 
his most recent research articles, analytic research reports, informative slide presentations, 
minutes of research discussions on the various financial topics and strategic economic issues 
within the scope of our research interest as well as an electronic copy of his very innovative      
Ph. D. Thesis: “Long-term commitments, dynamic optimization, and the business cycle,” 
supervised by Stanley Fischer, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
USA. Bernanke (2013b) stated recently: “When I was in graduate school, my teacher, Stanley 
Fischer, introduced me to the work of Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz, which demonstrated 
that monetary policy can have enormous effects on how the economy performs, for good or for 
ill. That realization helped motivate me to specialize, in graduate school and after, in monetary 
economics and related fields.” Bernanke (2013c) continued to explain: “Stan was my teacher in 
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graduate school, and he has been both a role model and a frequent adviser ever since. An expert 
on financial crises, Stan has written prolifically on the subject and has also served on the front 
lines, so to speak--notably, in his role as the first deputy managing director of the International 
Monetary Fund during the emerging market crises of the 1990s. Stan also helped to fight 
hyperinflation in Israel in the 1980s and, as the governor of that nation’s central bank, deftly 
managed monetary policy to mitigate the effects of the recent crisis on the Israeli economy. 
Subsequently, as Israeli housing prices ran upward, Stan became an advocate and early adopter 
of macroprudential policies to preserve financial stability. Stan frequently counseled his students 
to take a historical perspective, which is good advice in general, but particularly helpful for 
understanding financial crises, which have been around a very long time.” Describing the current 
economic crisis Bernanke (2013c) makes the following comments: “The recent crisis echoed 
many aspects of the 1907 panic. Like most crises, the recent episode had an identifiable trigger--
in this case, the growing realization by market participants that subprime mortgages and certain 
other credits were seriously deficient in their underwriting and disclosures. As the economy 
slowed and housing prices declined, diverse financial institutions, including many of the largest 
and most internationally active firms, suffered credit losses that were clearly large but also hard 
for outsiders to assess. Pervasive uncertainty about the size and incidence of losses in turn led to 
sharp withdrawals of short-term funding from a wide range of institutions; these funding 
pressures precipitated fire sales, which contributed to sharp declines in asset prices and further 
losses.” 
Let us note that the financial crisis in the USA has a strong impact on the venture capital 
investments in the conditions of the diffusion-type financial system in Block, Sandner (2009):     
“a financial crisis can have a strong, exogenous impact on VC activity, which can then lead to a 
severe “funding gap” in the financing of technological development and innovation. Unlike the 
last slowdown of VC activities after the collapse of the New Economy bubble in the year 2000, 
the current slowdown came more as an exogenous shock. In the current crisis, it was clearly not 
unrealistic expectations regarding the Internet and the New Economy but instead a 
malfunctioning financial sector that initiated the downturn that caused the slowdown.” Let us 
also highlight the fact that, in the conditions of the economic crisis, many serious questions have 
to be answered in Block, Sandner (2009): “Many questions are left unanswered and provide 
good opportunities for future research. 
1. Does the impact of financial crises on VC activity differ among industries or 
regions? For example, is there a similar effect of the financial crisis in biotechnology or 
semiconductor fields? 
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2. How do start-ups receiving funding in this financial crisis differ from start-ups 
that had received funding before the financial crisis? 
3. Is there a kind of selection effect, where only the more promising ventures receive 
funding? 
4. How do the start-ups respond to the challenges posed by the financial crisis and 
the difficulties encountered in the search for VC funding? 
5. Does a lower success rate of VC-backed companies lead to a decline in the 
performance of VC funds? And ultimately, over a long time period, does VC as a financing 
instrument for innovative start-ups become severely harmed as an effect of the crisis?” 
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profitable venture capital investment deals, when playing the golf in Europe, North America, 
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